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Abstract
The “new materialisms” offer an important critique of “human exceptionalism,” chal-
lenging deeply held conceptions of “man” as a “sovereign subject.” However, they tend
to overstate their claims by ignoring those qualities of freedom that still remain distinc-
tive to human life. This article turns to Beauvoir to make a case for a more “modest”
human exceptionalism: while she also grounds the human inextricably in the mate-
rial, Beauvoir offers fuller resources than do new materialisms for examining human
freedom and human responsibility to resist its oppression.
Résumé
Les tenants des «nouveaux matérialismes» proposent une critique importante de
l’«exceptionnalisme humain», laquelle remet en cause la conception fondamentale
de l’«Homme» en tant que «sujet souverain». Cependant, ils ont tendance à exagé-
rer leurs prétentions en ignorant les formes de liberté qui singularisent la vie humaine.
Cet article recourt à Beauvoir pour plaider en faveur d’un exceptionnalisme humain
plus «modeste» : si elle situe aussi l’ être humain au cœur de l’ inextricable matéria-
lité dumonde, ses travaux fournissent des ressources plus complètes que les nouveaux
matérialismes pour examiner la liberté humaine et la responsabilité de résister à son
oppression qui en découle.
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This paper engages with the “newmaterialisms” by bringing them into conver-
sation with the work of Simone de Beauvoir. Beauvoir’s philosophy of ambi-
guity insists on the embodied qualities of human existence and it resonates
with much of what is valuable about the new materialisms. However, she also
diverges from some of their more emphatic denials of “human exceptional-
ism.” There are differences among the new materialisms, but fundamental to
all of them is their insistence on the openness and indeterminacy of material
processes and on the way these flow across the boundaries, as conventionally
conceived, between human beings and all other organic life forms and (also
for some thinkers) inorganic materiality. Elizabeth Grosz, for example, writes
that “there is no definitive break between animals andhumans, or between ani-
mals, plants, and inanimate objects.Mind is not an attribute of a consciousness
much like our own but characterizes all primary forms.”1 As Diana Coole and
Samantha Frost well summarize, for the newmaterialists
thehuman species, and thequalities of self-reflection, self-awareness, and
rationality traditionally used to distinguish it from the rest of nature, may
now seem little more than contingent and provisional forms or processes
within a broader evolution or cosmic productivity. […] From this per-
spective the difference between humans and animals, or even between
sentient andnon-sentientmatter, is a questionof degreemore thankind.2
The new materialisms in important ways deepen critiques of the “sovereign
subject” that have already been elaborated by environmental, feminist, post-
colonial, and critical race theorists. They effectively contest still-pervasive, neo-
Cartesian conceptions of “rational man” as a disembodied sovereign subject,
themaster of all creation. Calling attention to the intrinsic inherence of human
beings in the material world, they help to moderate the hubris that justifies
such a “man’s” domination of nature and of “lesser” human beings. However,
in their eagerness further to discredit the myth of man the sovereign, and to
dismiss the claims of “human exceptionalism” that accompany it, they tend
to exaggerate their own claims for the dissolution of the distinctly human.
Accordingly, various difficulties, both ontological and ethico-political arise,
and I shall argue throughmy reading of Beauvoir that there still remains a case
for acknowledging the existence of what I call amodest human exceptionalism.
1 Elizabeth Grosz, The Incorporeal: Ontology, Ethics, and the Limits of Materialism, New York,
Columbia University Press, 2017, p. 13.
2 Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, “Introducing the New Materialisms,” in NewMaterialisms:
Ontology, Agency, and Politics, ed. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, Durham, NC, Duke Uni-
versity Press, 1–43, pp. 20–21.
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Who counts as a “newmaterialist” is something of an open question, since a
range of thinkers who also differ somewhat in foci and emphases have become
grouped together under this title. Even so, and at the risk of over-simplifying,
here I sketch out in broad-brush what I find most problematic about the new
materialisms. First, by working at too general a level of abstraction, they tend
to collapse the human into the material world writ large to such an extreme
degree that they obscure what still remains ontologically distinct to human
life: namely, the qualities particular to human agency that should be called
“freedom.” Human freedom, I shall argue, while not “sovereign” but rather inex-
tricably material, still remains qualitatively distinct from the “agency” that
new materialists wish to attribute, variously, to “assemblages” and “actants;”
to human-nonhuman “intra-actions,” or to indivisible “entanglements” of sen-
tient and non-sentient matter. To elide what is better called the “dynamism”
of matter, that is, its effective energy or force, with the intentional agency of
which human beings are capable, namely freedom, has the benefit of hum-
bling human hubris. However, it also obscures rather than illuminates many
phenomena that are the effects of distinctly human action.3
Second, the new materialisms generally emphasize the contingency and
indeterminacy of the material, often advancing an ontology grounded in quan-
tum theory, or sometimes in neo-Bergsonian or other vitalist theories of “flu-
idity” or of open “becoming.” However, their persistent focus on indetermi-
nacy comes at the cost of obscuring aspects of material human life in which
power relations, such as those of class and social status, are stably instantiated.
The long-term reproduction of inequalities and forms of domination among
human beings, and the effects of those specifically intra-human institutions,
practices, and relations that can block human freedom and give rise to its
oppression, can become occluded. Indeed, in their focus on the general inde-
terminacy, flows, and porosity of the material the new materialisms are often
so inattentive to specific social contexts and power differentials that they risk
3 Bruno Latour has been especially influential here in arguing for nonhuman agency. For him,
“assemblages” consist of human and nonhuman “actants,” in which “agency” is said to pertain
not to individual entities but instead to lie in their “intra-action.” Seehis Politics of Nature:How
to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, trans. Catherine Porter, Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA, 2004. See, similarly, the “actor-network theory” of Lambros Malafouris: “Agency
and intentionality may not be innate properties of things, but they are not innate properties
of humans either; they are emergent properties of material engagement, that is, of the grey
zone where brain, body and culture conflate.” “At the Potter’sWheel: An Argument for Mate-
rial Agency,” in Material Agency: Towards a Non-Anthropocentric Approach, ed. Carl Knappett
and Lambros Malafouris, Berlin, Springer, 19–36, p. 22.
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producing an analogue to the very universalism that they critique: just as the
celebration of universal “man” risks obscuring oppressive social differences, so
toomay the celebration of amaterial oneness inwhich “we” all participate dan-
gerously obscure them.4
Third, although the starting-point for the new materialists is broadly onto-
logical in orientation, an inquiry into the qualities of material being writ large,
they are also driven by strong ethico-political commitments concerning hu-
man ecological damage or the destruction of “gaia,” and some are also con-
cerned with concomitant harms to human beings. However, because “agency”
is said tobe sowidely and fluidly distributedamongdiverse “intra-acting”mate-
rial entities, human responsibility for harms—which are alone those harms
thatwemight and should endeavor to ameliorate—becomedifficult to identify.
For, importantly, human responsibility does not involve only the attribution of
blame (whether this be to individuals, collectivities, and/or institutions) but
also an obligation to ameliorate or prevent harms. It would not make sense,
for example, to call on beavers to cease blocking rivers, but we can object to
human plans to dam them, and we can hold human agents responsible for
addressing environmental and social harms that have resulted from their con-
struction.
Beauvoir was not a new materialist avant la lettre and her moral concerns
did not extend to care of the material world writ large or to the sufferings of
animals (though one might speculate that they possibly would do so were she
alive today). However, her focus on the material qualities of human existence,
on the always-embodied and situated qualities of the particular kind of agency
that we may call human “freedom,” and on the ways in which intra-human
relations are always materially mediated, enables her to address the materi-
ality of human life in ways that challenge overly emphatic rejections of human
exceptionalism—yet do so without returning us to the terrain of the disem-
bodied “sovereign subject.” Beauvoir also carefully shows us, in ways the new
materialists generally do not, how freedommay come to be blocked by specifi-
callyhuman agency. For, contrary tonewmaterialist affirmations of fluidity and
openness, freedom is often oppressed by persistent, even reified, power-laden
human institutions and practices, such as those to which women and other
groups are subject. There is, she argues, a specifically human responsibility
4 For an excellent exploration of this issue from the perspective of postcolonial feminism, and
a call for greater attention to the specificity of concrete human situations, see Deboleena Roy
andBanuSubramaniam, “Matter in the Shadows: FeministNewMaterialismand thePractices
of Colonialism,” in Mattering: Feminism, Science, and Materialism, ed. Victoria Pitts-Taylor,
New York, New York University Press, 2016, pp. 23–42.
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for such oppressions. This concerns not only making retrospective judgments
about blame but also includes the forward-looking imperative to act to address
oppressions. In this respect, she writes, one can be “responsible” without being
“guilty.”5
Inwhat follows,my paper proceeds in four sections. The first discusses some
ontological questions raised by reading Beauvoir with and against the more
emphatic of the newmaterialists, taking Jane Bennett’s work as a key example.
The second then turns to the “Biology” chapter of The Second Sex to consider
what Beauvoir tells us about the ambiguity of the material, embodied qual-
ity of human existence in general; about how, if you like, human beings are
at once both on and off a continuum with other animal species. The third
section turns to Beauvoir’s examination of humanly established and persis-
tent material institutions as they oppressively impinge on women. Here, the
question of need and Beauvoir’s appropriation of aspects of a different kind of
materialism—namely,historicalmaterialism—to examine oppression come to
the fore. The final section focuses on Beauvoir’s discussion of abortion in The
Second Sex as a site at which to draw together the strands of my argument.
1 Matters of Ontology
There is a spectrumof intensitieswithwhich thenewmaterialists reject human
exceptionalism, and a few perhaps lie somewhat nearer to my own defense
of a “modest” exceptionalism. Frost, for example, more “modestly” argues that
“what we need in place of the fantasy of human exceptionalism is a different
figure of the human, one that does not succumb to the conceits of old but also
does not conceptually dissolve humans as identifiable agents.”6 However, the
more common and emphatic rejections of human exceptionalism endeavor to
refute humandifference by dissolving the humanwithin the “agentic” qualities,
the “animacy,” or (in pan-psychic variants) the “consciousness,” of all material
phenomena. Agency, intentionality, even consciousness, it is claimed, are qual-
5 Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, trans. Bernard Frechtman, New York, Citadel
Books, 1967 [1947], p. 98. Subsequent references to this work are indicated by the abbrevi-
ation EA. How far responsibility, in either sense, is individual and how far collective, how
far attributable to groups or mediated by institutions or social structures, are complex ques-
tions of which Beauvoir is well aware. Although responsibility may often be distributed, and
intentions and outcomes may frequently be misaligned, this does not per se diminish our
accountability, she argues.
6 Samantha Frost, Biocultural Creatures: Toward aNewTheory of theHuman, Durham, NC, Duke
University Press, 2016, p. 13.
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ities of being in toto. They persist over the plenum of all things and processes,
from the quantum level upwards or, sometimes less ambitiously, they are qual-
ities of all living organisms. Some new materialists draw from recent develop-
ments in sub-atomic physics, inferring the qualities of all material existence
from quantum indeterminacy. For example, Karen Barad claims that “[q]uan-
tum physics is part of a complexly entangled web of phenomena that include
scientific, technological, military, economic, medical, political, social, and cul-
tural apparatuses of bodily production, to name but a few.”7 In a similar vein,
Alexander Wendt writes, “All intentional phenomena are quantum mechani-
cal. That goes both for the private thoughts inside our heads and for public or
collective intentions like norms, culture, and language, whichwemight generi-
cally call institutions.”8 Others turn instead, or as well, to biology and to vitalist
traditions in order to contest any significant animal-human distinctions. For
example, “according to Darwinian precepts,” Grosz writes, “culture is not dif-
ferent in kind from nature. […] [L]anguage, culture, intelligence, reason, imag-
ination, memory—terms commonly claimed as defining characteristics of the
human and the cultural—are all equally effects of the same rigorous criteria of
natural selection.”9
Jane Bennett, to whose work I now turn, exemplifies the difficulties that
attend the more emphatic end of the anti-exceptionalism spectrum. She in-
vokes Spinoza’s monism as her “touchstone,” writing: “I share his faith that
everything is made of the same substance. Spinoza rejected the idea that man
‘disturbs rather than follows Nature’s order’ and promises instead to ‘consider
humanactions and appetites just as if itwere an investigation into lines, planes,
or bodies.’ ”10 However, if a monistic materiality encompasses the totality of
being then it is difficult clearly to distinguish the human from other mate-
rial entities. Instead, agency is seen as distributed more widely across material
7 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of
Matter andMeaning, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2007, p. 388.
8 Alexander Wendt, Quantum Mind and Social Science: Unifying Physical and Social Ontol-
ogy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 149.
9 Elizabeth Grosz, “Darwin and Feminism,” in Material Feminisms, ed. Stacy Alaimo and
SusanHekman, Bloomington, IN, IndianaUniversity Press, 2008, 25–51, pp. 43–44. See also
further examples of work in a newmaterialist vein in Alaimo and Hekman, eds., Material
Feminisms; Mel Chen, Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering and Queer Affect, Durham,
NC, Duke University Press, 2012; Coole and Frost, eds., NewMaterialisms; Richard Grusin,
ed., The Nonhuman Turn, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2015; Susan Hek-
man, The Material of Knowledge, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 2010; Knap-
pett and Malafouris, eds., Material Agency.
10 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, Durham, NC, Duke University
Press, 2010, p. x.
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entities and flows, emerging in the unpredictable play or “intra-action” among
diverse kinds of “actants.” An actant may be human or nonhuman and, as Ben-
nett quotes from Bruno Latour, “It implies no special motivation of human
individual actors, nor of humans in general.”11 It follows then that claims as to
the specificity of human beings as subjective knowers or intentional agents are
profoundly put into question. In her radical challenge to “human exceptional-
ism” Bennett thus asks us:
[to] picture an ontological field without any unequivocal demarcations
between human, animal, vegetable, or mineral. All forces and flows (ma-
terialities) are or can become lively, effective, and signaling. And so an
affective, speaking human body is not radically different from the affec-
tive, signaling nonhumans with which it coexists, hosts, enjoys, serves,
consumes, produces, and competes.12
However, an embodied human being is “radically different from the affective,
signaling nonhumans with which it coexists.” Indeed, the very distinction Ben-
nettmakes in the passage (surely with shades of Aristotle) between a “speaking
human body” and “signaling nonhumans” points toward a significant leap or
disjuncture, one which radically differentiates the human.13 Members of other
species may certainly also demonstrate qualities of consciousness and agency
as they respond to each other and to their environments. But that human
beings are (among their other distinctive characteristics) a uniquely speaking,
indeed concept-forming, symbolic-language using species, shapes their agency
and consciousness in particular ways, and is integral to the qualities specific
to human freedom. However—and as Beauvoir insists—this is not to affirm
that human consciousness is autonomous or disembodied. To the contrary,
specifically human bodily characteristics are precisely what enable particular
qualities and abilities, including the capacity for speech, that human beings
alone possess. Indeed, as Charles Fernyhough points out, “for all their propen-
sities for learning sign language, chimps and bonobos can’t even get started on
human speech. […] [T]hey simply can’t shape their tongue, lips andmouths in
the right contortions.”14
11 Ibid., p. 9.
12 Ibid., pp. 116–117, emphasis added.
13 Ibid., emphasis added.
14 Charles Fernyhough, The Baby in the Mirror, London, Granta Books, 2009, p. 72.
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Indeed, Bennett herself also implicitly acknowledges the presence of dis-
tinctive qualities of human consciousness when she later concedes, against
the grain of her own arguments, that there is a “performative contradiction”
involved in the activity of theorizing about human and nonhuman material
oneness.15 It is, she says, a “perfectly reasonable objection” to say that “the
‘posthumanist’ gestures of vital materialism entail a performative contradic-
tion: ‘Is it not, after all, a self-conscious, language wielding humanwho is artic-
ulating this philosophy of vibrant matter?’ ”16 To this objection Bennett offers
not a response, however, but rather a deflection:Why, she asks, even if we agree
that humans participate in assemblages with other material “actants” in which
agency is not specifically “theirs,” do we still look for “that special something
thatmakes human participation in assemblages radically different?”17Why, she
asks, “are we so keen to distinguish the human self from the field?”18 There are
several possible good answers to this question, and someof themost important
bear on our capacities for moral and political life. Bennett, being quite consis-
tent here, seeks to reject attributions of moral blame to human actors, be they
individuals or collectivities, because, she argues, agency is too complexly dis-
tributed among actants for this to be justified.
Discussing the great blackout of 2003 (which leftmanymillions in theNorth-
east United States without electric power for several days) as an example,
Bennett suggests there was “not so much a doer (an agent) behind the deed
(the blackout) as a doing and effecting by a human-nonhuman assemblage.”19
Therewas, she says, a “confederate” agency inwhich the sources of the blackout
included (among others) not only social attitudes, government policy, and cor-
porate greed but also nonhuman “agencies” such as “a quirky electron flow and
a spontaneous fire.”20 Their intra-actionwas such, she argues, that “blame” can-
not be attributed to specific personsor entities, not even to the executives of the
energy company.21 “This federation of actants is a creature that the concept of
moral responsibility fits only loosely and to which the charge of blame will not
quite stick,” she claims.22 Instead, she suggests a theory of “distributive agency”
in which there is “always a swarm of vitalities at play.”23 If by “blame” one sim-
15 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, p. 120.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., p. 121.
18 Ibid.




23 Ibid., pp. 31, 32.
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ply means having played some role in producing an event, then we could say,
as Bennett does, that “blame” is distributed amongmany and diverse phenom-
ena that intra-act. But even then, “blame” is not necessarily evenly distributed
and it may “stick” to some “agents”—in this case executives of the energy com-
pany with whom Bennett says she has some sympathy—far more than to oth-
ers. However, “responsibility” is not only a matter of retrospectively assigning
blame for what has occurred. It also carries a forward-looking meaning: being
responsible also implies having an obligation to redress or mitigate harms, or
to try to prevent their future occurrences. But “responsibility” in this sense can
only be demanded of human beings, for it requires capacities for deliberation
and judgment, for consciously planning and coordinating actions, and so forth,
that flows of electrons, fires, and other material “agents” simply do not possess.
With this, letme return again to Bennett’s Spinozist claim thatman does not
“disturb the single substance of being.”24 Against such a view Beauvoir wrote
in 1944, in criticism of Spinoza, that it is impossible fully to identify oneself
with this “single substance.” To the contrary, I do “disturb” nature’s order, since
in the very act of claiming I do not do so, I distinguish myself from it: “My
presence is,” Beauvoir writes, and “it breaks up the unity and the continuity
of the mass of indifference into which I wanted it to be absorbed. Spinoza’s
existence sharply contradicts the truth of Spinozism.”25 Indeed, our very abil-
ity to formulate a concept such as “being”—or indeed to plan more reliable
electricity supply-systems—challenges amonisticmaterialism. It also suggests
that the “performative contradiction” that Bennett acknowledges, but does not
address, is more than a propositional paradox: it expresses the profound onto-
logical ambiguity of human existence. For, as Beauvoir also writes with regard
to sentient life, unlike for plants and animals, for human beings “life is not just
a natural process [although it is that]; it thinks itself [elle se pense elle-même],”
and man “is part of the world of which he is consciousness.”26 She goes on to
note that, as long as there have been philosophers, they have tried to mask this
highly disquieting ambiguity: “They have striven to reducemind tomatter, or to
absorb matter into mind, or to merge them together within a single substance
24 Bennett, Vibrant Matter, p. x.
25 Simone de Beauvoir, “Pyrrhus and Cineas,” in Philosophical Writings, ed. Margaret A.
Simons with Marybeth Timmermann and Mary Beth Mader, Urbana, University of Illi-
nois Press, 2004, 90–149, p. 101. Essay originally published in 1944. Subsequent references
to this work are indicated by the abbreviation PCE.
26 Simone de Beauvoir, “Introduction to an Ethics of Ambiguity,” in Philosophical Writings,
ed. Margaret A. Simons with Marybeth Timmermann and Mary Beth Mader, Urbana, IL,
University of Illinois Press, 2004, 289–298, p. 289, emphasis added. Introduction originally
published in 1946.
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[dans une substance unique].”27 However, neither dualism which, as she notes,
ends either by reducing consciousness to matter or matter to consciousness,
nor a monism that affirms the unity of being as a “single substance,” can grasp
that paradoxical existent: a humanbeing. For to be human is to be, indissolubly,
a material and a conscious existent: an embodied subjectivity.
This is not to say, however, that human existence is a harmonious blend-
ing of materiality and consciousness, of body and subjectivity; there is no
smooth or happy “synthesis” found here. To the contrary, human existence
involves a painful ambiguity, indeed, she says, it is lived as a heart-wrenching
“tear” (un déchirement) in being; an ever-unstable, painful, paradoxical, ten-
sion, in which one must give up “any hope of escaping into inner purity or
losing [oneself] in some foreign object.”28 Moreover, even though each lives
this ambiguous freedom individually, it is always and necessarily lived as an
ambiguity that weaves itself throughout the multiplicity of human social rela-
tions within which each is situated. For although freedom is an ontological
quality of human existence, it can only be realized as it projects itself into the
social world. It requires a concrete, practical field for its enactment and so it
cannot be other than intra-humanly (as well as otherwise materially) situated.
For “no existence can be validly fulfilled if it is limited to itself. It appeals to the
existence of others” and, accordingly, “to will oneself free is also to will others
free.”29
However, here, in the intra-human ontological qualities of human freedom
also lies the possibility of its oppression. For human beings are vulnerable to
specific humanly initiated harms in situations where their ambiguous, embod-
ied freedom is limited or foreclosed by the actions of others, or by the sedimen-
tation of human actions in oppressive social practices and institutions.30 “Man
is never oppressed by things,” Beauvoir writes. She goes on to observe that,
Certainly, amaterial obstaclemay cruelly stand in theway of anundertak-
ing: floods, earthquakes, locusts, epidemics and plagues are scourges […].
[However] one does not submit to a war or an occupation as one does to
an earthquake: one must take a side for or against it, through which the
27 Ibid. p. 290, translation modified.
28 Simone de Beauvoir, “Moral Idealism and Political Realism,” in PhilosophicalWritings, ed.
Margaret A. Simons withMarybeth Timmermann andMary BethMader, Urbana, Univer-
sity of Illinois Press, 2004, 175–193, p. 190. Essay originally published in 1945.
29 EA, pp. 67, 72.
30 See Sonia Kruks, Simone de Beauvoir and the Politics of Ambiguity, New York, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2012, especially chapter 2, for my fuller discussion of the various dynamics
through which oppression can operate.
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foreign wills become allied or hostile. It is this interdependence which
explains why oppression is possible and why it is hateful.31
Here, then, responsibility arises for Beauvoir as an ontologically given commit-
ment to struggle against oppressions even when one is not oneself subjected
to them, and to do so in the full knowledge that one’s solidarity may well result
in failure of various kinds.32
Alia Al-Saji has argued that Beauvoir’s work (notablyThe Second Sex) suffers
froma contradiction between affirming an existentialist philosophy of the free,
transcendent subject and a philosophy that attends to material life: there are
two “contradictory aspects of the work,” she writes, continuing, “I find in The
Second Sex a tension between two different philosophical directions or com-
mitments: on the one hand, a philosophy of existence, which privileges con-
scious existence and transcendence as the taking up and surpassing of mate-
riality and life, and, on the other, hand, a tentative philosophy of life and time
that understands life in termsof ramified tendencies subject to social-historical
elaboration and actualization.”33 However, this is surely not a contradiction on
Beauvoir’s part. Rather, the “tension” Beauvoir presents is the difficult ontolog-
ical tension of human life itself : that of an ambiguous existent that is at once
consciousness and materiality, at once individual and social-historical. In the
next sections I focus more fully on The Second Sex, for this is where Beauvoir
examines such ambiguity and its vulnerability the most extensively. Exploring
the situation of women, she both anticipates what is important in newmateri-
alist critiques of “man’s” claims to be a “sovereign subject,” while also insisting
on what remains distinctively human: namely, the existence of an embodied
(thusmaterial) and also always a socially and historically situated (and thus, in
other ways, material) freedom.34 Crucially, then, this is a freedom that can be
subject to oppression.
31 EA, pp. 81–82, translation modified.
32 On the tendency to failure inherent in political action, see especially Beauvoir, “Moral Ide-
alism and Political Realism.”
33 Alia Al-Saji, “Material Life: BergsonianTendencies in Simone de Beauvoir’s Philosophy,” in
Differences:RereadingBeauvoir and Irigaray, ed. EmilyAnnParker andAnnevanLeeuwen,
New York, Oxford University Press, 2018, 21–53, p. 24.
34 As Toril Moi has nicely put it, Beauvoir makes “the double claim that the body is a situa-
tion and that it always is in situation.”What Is aWoman?AndOther Essays, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1999, p. 67.
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2 Ambiguities of Embodiment in The Second Sex
Asking, in the introduction toThe SecondSex, “What is awoman?” Beauvoir ini-
tially answers that a woman is man’s “Other”: “She is the inessential compared
to the essential. He is the Subject; he is the Absolute. She is the Other.”35 How-
ever, this is not, contrary to some misreadings, an ontological claim on Beau-
voir’s part. Indeed, her key point is going to be precisely that man is not—he
cannot be—the Absolute, the Subject, as he asserts; nor can woman be wholly
hisOther. It is rather that, in his vain endeavor to assert himself as theAbsolute,
man projects onto woman what he seeks to escape: namely, the vulnerability
and finitude that accompany his embodiment. He thus casts her, above all, as
body: as her sex, as womb, and as threatening nature. However, this endeavor
is bound to fail. As Beauvoir drily observes:
Man claims to make Spirit [l’Esprit] triumph over Life, activity over pas-
sivity; his consciousness keeps nature at a distance, his will shapes it, but
in the form [la figure] of his sex organ he rediscovers life, nature, and pas-
sivity in himself […]. As a subject he posits theworld, and, remaining out-
side theuniverse heposits, hemakes himself lord of it; if he grasps himself
as flesh, as sex, he is no longer autonomous consciousness, transparent
freedom: he is engaged in the world, a limited and perishable object.36
Conversely, women are not reducible to the role of theOther. Althoughwomen
have, for themost part, complied in their alterity to varying extents, they too are
subjects. “What specifically defines the situation of woman,” Beauvoir writes,
“is that while being, like all human beings, an autonomous freedom, she finds
and chooses herself in a world wheremen force her to assume herself as Other:
an attempt ismade to freeze her as an object [onprétend la figer en objet].”37 But
if woman could literally be reduced to man’s Other, to the status of a material
object vis-à-vis the Subject, or if he were no more than a pure consciousness,
then both would cease to be human beings at all.
Indeed, if woman’s objectificationwere complete, this couldnot satisfyman,
since she could no longer be brought to recognize his status as the Absolute.
35 Simone de Beauvoir,The Second Sex, trans. Constance Borde and SheilaMalovany-Cheval-
lier, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2010, p. 6, translation modified; originally published as Le
DeuxièmeSexe, vol. 1, Gallimard, coll. “Folio,” Paris, 1988 [1949], p. 15. Subsequent references
to these works are respectively indicated by the abbreviations SS and DSI.
36 SS, p. 180; DSI, p. 270.
37 SS, p. 17, translation modified; DSI, p. 31.
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Thus what is at issue here is what Axel Honneth has helpfully called “fictive
reification”—the treatment of persons “as if they were mere things.”38 How-
ever, fictions are also “real”: that is, they carry weight; they have effects that
take material forms; they shape human bodies and needs, desires, and agen-
cies. Furthermore, because such fictions are not literally “destinies,” because
they are not actually determinate, theywill also demand some complicity from
their “objects.” Women, it follows, play a part in their own alterity.
Strikingly, Beauvoir starts the chapter on biology by taking pains to point out
that the division of a species into two sexes in not a universal necessity. To the
contrary, in many one-celled species multiplication takes place without sexual
differentiation; in other species there is parthenogenesis or hermaphroditism.
Besides, she points out, even when there is generally clear-cut sexual dimor-
phism, intersexuality is still common in numerous species—including human
beings. “Even in species where sexual division is the most clear-cut, there are
individuals that are both male and female simultaneously: cases of intersex-
uality are numerous in animals and human beings.”39 “Indeed,” she claims, “in
nature nothing is ever completely clear: the two types,male and female, are not
always sharply distinguished.”40 As the new materialists helpfully elaborate in
farmore depth than Beauvoir, there ismuch greater openness and contingency
in nature than wholly “finalist” biological theories suppose.
In anticipatory agreementwith thenewmaterialisms, Beauvoir also suggests
that a certain “transcendence” and a “project” (her terms) can be attributed
to all animate phenomena: “we can affirm that all living phenomena [tout
fait vivant] indicate a transcendence, that a project swells from every func-
tion [en toute fonction s’empâte un project].”41 “Transcendence,” that is, an
open project, an agency upsurging toward a future, is not then a quality of
human existence alone; however, it will still take distinct forms in human life.
Here the question of degrees of transcendence matters. One can, for exam-
ple, attribute a “small agency” to earthworms, as Bennett does, or acknowl-
edge certain reasoning processes, and individuated “personalities,” in higher
primates, and yet still affirm the distinctiveness of qualities of human free-
dom.42 For one does not have to be a committed Habermasian to acknowledge
that the unique human ability for speech, with its key role in enabling not
38 Axel Honneth, Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea, ed. Martin Jay, Oxford, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2008, p. 157.
39 SS, p. 30; DSI, p. 49.
40 SS, p. 38; DSI, p. 61.
41 SS, p. 26, translation modified; DSI, p. 43.
42 On the agency of earthworms, see Bennett, Vibrant Matter, pp. 94–98.
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only subjective and intersubjective human life but also our greater ability than
other species to transform our own culture and ambient material world over
time, distinguishes us even as we remain on a continuum with other animate
species.43 Indeed, as Frost writes, in a less anti-exceptionalist vein than Ben-
nett, “to insist on human creatureliness is not to deny humans’ difference from
other creatures, and there does not seem to be a particularly good reason to
refuse to acknowledge the difference of human creatures from other creatures
too.”44
Far from being a “mute facticity” for Beauvoir, as Judith Butler once said,
one’s body is how one exists in the world: one is one’s body.45 Indeed, already
in infancy, and irrespective of sex, “the body is first the radiation of subjectiv-
ity, the instrument that brings about comprehension of the world.”46 However,
for a girl, her “sexual specification” also begins in infanthood, for “her vocation
is imperiously breathed [insufflée] into her from the first years of her life.”47
But, then, we might well ask, what has female biology to do with this “voca-
tion”?Well, everything and nothing. For the female child is being prepared for
the “destiny” which her biology is (wrongly) said to necessitate—but which it
does, indeed, uniquely enable: that is, childbearing and all that has been made
to accompany it.
Only female mammals bear their young internally and suckle them, and
Beauvoir argues that this form of reproduction places a far greater physiologi-
cal burden on the females of the species, including human ones, than onmales.
Thus, if one proceeds abstractly, fromwhat she calls “an exclusively physiologi-
cal point of view,” it is true that women are negatively subjected to the require-
ments of human species reproduction in ways that men are not.48 “A woman
is her body as a man is his, but her body is something other than herself,” she
writes.49 Notably during menstruation, a woman acutely feels that her body is
“an alienated opaque thing,” while, physiologically speaking alone, pregnancy
43 As Beauvoir writes: “One speaks only tomen. Language is an appeal to the other’s freedom
since the sign is only a sign through a consciousness that grasps it again.”PCE, p. 133.
44 Frost, Biocultural Creatures, p. 4.
45 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, New York, Rout-
ledge, 1990, p. 129.
46 SS, p. 283; Le Deuxième Sexe, vol. 2, coll. “Folio,” Paris, Gallimard, 1989 [1949], p. 13. Subse-
quent references to this work are indicated by the abbreviation DSII.
47 SS, p. 283; DSII, p. 14. Beauvoir’s striking metaphor of “breath” is significant here: a girl’s
“vocation” is not inscribed on her body as social-constructionists would say; it literally
becomes intrinsic to her living, embodied being.
48 SS, p. 42, note 8; DSI, p. 67, note 2.
49 SS, p. 41, translation modified; DSI, p. 67.
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itself has no benefits for a woman; it is exhausting, dangerous, and so forth.50
Beauvoir’s account of the female body andwomen’s bodily experience, describ-
ing how their reproductive physiology renders women, unlike men, “slaves” to
the needs of the species, has been the subject of numerous feminist critiques.
Yet, while Beauvoir’s heightened rhetorical tone is certainly disturbing, it is not
grounds for rejecting her claim about women’s bodies: namely, that at the level
of their physiology, that is, abstracted from all else that shapes human lives,
women’s bodies are in general (but also recalling that “in nature, nothing is ever
completely clear”) farmore onerously subject to the demands of species repro-
duction than men’s.51
However, as Beauvoir goes on to insist, in actuality, “it is not possible tomea-
sure in the abstract the burden of the generative function forwoman.”52 Indeed,
not all females are “women”, she observes, and—famously—“one is not born a
woman, one becomes one.”53 From infanthood onward, a girl is schooled for
what is deemed her natural “vocation”—namely, “motherhood,” and all that
it has implied (and continues to imply) about the privileging of heterosexual-
ity, heterosexual marriage, female child-rearing, women’s exclusions from eco-
nomic activities and public life, and so forth. But whether, how far, or in what
manner, a particular woman will embrace this “vocation” still remains open.
For this remains a matter of freedom and of how she takes up the constraints
of her situation. Thus, in the second volume of The Second Sex, “Lived Experi-
ence,” Beauvoir describes at length the tremendous variety in howwomen take
up and experience the biological specificities that are pervasive aspects of their
lives. As Beauvoir concludes the “Biology” chapter: “[A] woman’s body is one of
the essential elements of the situation she occupies in this world. But neither
is it sufficient to define her […]; biology is not sufficient to provide an answer
to the question that concerns us: Why is woman the Other?”54
50 SS, p. 41; DSI, p. 67. However, she also notes that maternity may have psychological ben-
efits. SS, p. 42, note 8; DSI, p. 67, note 2. In volume 2 she describes a great variety of ways
women experience maternity, some of which offer satisfactions.
51 SS, p. 38; DSI, p. 61.
52 SS, p. 46, emphasis added; DSI, pp. 74–75.
53 SS, p. 283, translation modified; DSII, p. 13.
54 SS, p. 48, translation modified; DSI, p. 77.
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3 Need andMaterial Institutions: A Historical Materialist Approach
Butwhy, then, iswoman sopersistently theOther?Also crucial iswomen’s place
within the social organization of material production. “Economically, men and
women form almost two castes,” Beauvoir writes, and, unlike in other species,
“individual ‘possibilities’ depend on the economic and social situation.”55 Thus,
women’s roles (or lack of them) in economic production, and their limited
access to material resources, establish situations of need and dependence that
work to perpetuate their alterity. Here, extrapolations from quantum indeter-
minacy, Spinozist claims that all pertains to a single substance, or celebrations
of the vibrancy matter do not much help. They do not offer us a grasp on the
stability of large-scale human institutions and practices that facilitate perva-
sive forms of oppression.
To explore women’s enduring oppression, Beauvoir selectively turns to an
earlier and different kind of materialist theory—historical materialism. This
offers resources to examine how human actions become sedimented in social
structures and institutions that can stabilize relations of alterity and delimit
human freedom. It thus offers insights into how the differential material vul-
nerability of some kinds of people (but not others) to social injustices and
oppression arises, and how such vulnerabilities are perpetuatedwithwhat, still
today, remains a remarkable degree of stability. Beauvoir was strongly critical
of the deterministic “orthodox” Marxism-Leninism, espoused by French Com-
munism in the 1940s. But, just as she rejected biology as a “destiny” while still
insisting on its significance, so too she drew her own insights from historical
materialism while rejecting its economic reductionism.56
“Need” is the pivot-point at which Beauvoir conjoins historical materialist
insights with her account of the materiality of the lived body itself.57 For the
55 SS, pp. 9, 46; DSI, pp. 21, 75.
56 For my fuller treatment of Beauvoir’s relationship with Marxism, see Sonia Kruks, “Beau-
voir and theMarxismQuestion,” in ACompanion to Simone de Beauvoir, ed. Laura Henge-
hold andNancy Bauer, Oxford, JohnWiley& Sons, 2017, pp. 236–248. In her autobiography
Beauvoir describes reading Das Kapital for the first time (probably in 1930). Although she
says she did not yet understand its full significance, she still describes it as a major forma-
tive experience: “[T]he theory of surplus value was a revelation for me […]. I condemned
exploitationwith all my heart and I felt an immense satisfaction in being shown itsmech-
anism. The world dawned on a new day at the moment when I saw labor to be the source
and substance of values. Nothing has ever made me deny this truth.” The Prime of Life,
trans. Peter Green, Cleveland,World Publishing, 1962 [1960], p. 46, translation modified.
57 Significantly, “need” later became a key concept in Jean-Paul Sartre’s account of human
praxis in the Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960). Writing, in 1963, a few years after Sartre
published the Critique, Beauvoir observed that, were she to write The Second Sex today,
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naturalizing of women’s reproductive role has long been used to justify exclud-
ing them fromaccess to property and valuedproductive activities (that is, activ-
ities valued from men’s point of view). Their ensuing dependence on men to
meet their material needs is also strongly conducive to their complicity. Thus
she writes:
To refuse to be the Other, to refuse complicity with man, would be to
renounce all the advantages that an alliance with the superior caste may
confer on them. Man-the-sovereign will provide woman-the-liege with
protection and take care of justifying her existence: along with economic
risk, she eludes the metaphysical risk of a freedom that must invent its
goals without help.58
Accordingly, Beauvoir’s reading of history emphasizes the key role that men’s
control of private property plays inmaintaining women in objective situations
of need and material dependence, situations that invite their complicity.
Focusing primarily on theWest, Beauvoir traces in historicalmaterialist vein
the long—andenduring—history of women’s economic exclusions anddepen-
dency, and their effects. “Once dethroned by the advent of private property,
woman’s fate is linked to it across the centuries,” shewrites, and “abstract right is
not sufficient to define the concrete situation of woman; this situation depends
in great part on the economic role she plays.”59 Thus, for example, in ancient
Greece, it was only in Sparta, where propertywas held in common, thatwoman
was “almost an equal of man,” while it was themonetization of feudal dues and
not the emergence of practices of “courtly love” that somewhat improved the
situation of women in the late Medieval period.60 Similarly, in discussing the
role of early nineteenth-century women’s reformers, Beauvoir also insists on
the primacy of material change, arguing that:
she would “base the notion of woman as other […] on the facts of scarcity and need.”
However, she continues, “this modification would not necessitate any changes in the
subsequent development of my argument.” Force of Circumstance, vol. 1, trans. Richard
Howard, 1992 [1963], p. 192, translation modified. This is yet another instance of the com-
plex entwinement of Sartre’s and Beauvoir’s thinking. Although the concept of “need” is
not yet as explicitly systematized in The Second Sex as it will be in the Critique, it runs as
an inexorable vein throughout the entire work and plays a dominant role in accounting
for women’s alterity.
58 SS, p. 10, translation modified, emphasis added; DSI, p. 21.
59 SS, pp. 90, 100, translation modified; DSI, pp. 136, 151.
60 SS, pp. 96, 109; DSI, pp. 145–146, 161.
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[I]t is not these theoretical debates that influenced the course of events;
they only timidly reflected them. Woman regains the economic impor-
tance lost since prehistoric times because she escapes the home andplays
a new role in production in the factory. Themachinemakes this upheaval
possible because the difference in physical strength between male and
female workers is canceled out in a great number of cases.61
However, technological change alone does not drive human history—nor do
class relations and class struggles. Thus, although the focus on production rela-
tions and ownership as sources of women’s subordination that originated with
Friedrich Engels’s analysis of “the woman question” remains crucial to Beau-
voir’s account of women’s enduring oppression, she also criticizes his economic
reductionism.62 For it is impossible, she writes, “to consider woman solely as a
productive force: for man she is a sexual partner, a reproducer, an erotic object,
an Other through whom he seeks himself.”63
It is in their ubiquitous designation as “mothers”—a term that designates
them as at once biological and social reproducers of the species—that the
specificities of women’s bodies are most fully moulded and acted upon by
diverse institutions and practices (economic, legal, political, religious, and so
forth) that place them in situations of material need anddependence.64 “Moth-
erhood” involves not only the bearing and birthing of children but usually
primary responsibility for their long-term care and upbringing. Changes since
Beauvoir’s era notwithstanding, this broadly continues to be the case. In princi-
ple, pregnancy can now be avoided with contraception, and there is absolutely
no biological necessity that birth-mothers (or other women) be the ones to
raise children. Yet, still, the vast majority of women in the United States (and
elsewhere) bear children, and women continue to be their primary carers.65
61 SS, p. 132; DSI, p. 195.
62 Beauvoir focuses her critique of “orthodox” Marxism’s treatment of women on Engels’s
work, The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State (1884), since this was the
canonical source for the Communist analysis of “the woman question” up to and includ-
ing Beauvoir’s era, and beyond.
63 SS, p. 67, emphasis added; DSI, p. 104.
64 “There is no way directly to oblige a woman to give birth: all that can be done is to enclose
her in situations where motherhood is her only option: law or customs impose marriage
onher, contraceptivemeasures andabortionareprohibited, divorce is forbidden.” SS, p. 67;
DSI, p. 104.
65 Women are now having children at a later age than previously, but in 2016, 86%had given
birth by age 40–44. See “They’re Waiting Longer, but U.S. Women Today More Likely to
Have Children Than a Decade Ago,” webpage, Pew Research Center, www.pewresearch
.org.
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While for thosewhodonot have children, thenorms andpractices surrounding
women’s purported maternal “vocation” continue to shape expectations and
identities.
Still today, their material dependence onmen tomeet their needs remains a
constant in the lives of the majority of women. This dependence is frequently
effected through reliance on an individual man’s income by the “stay at home”
mother, or of the woman who works part time (and usually at low wages) to
accommodate childcare and domestic duties. In other situations it is effected
through the need for “single mothers” (the poorest group of women) to obtain
meagre resources from a patriarchal welfare state that also supervises their
lives. For those women who do fully enter the labor force, women’s average
incomes, evenwhen in full-time employment, remain far lower thanmen’s and
are often inadequate.66 Here again, the stability and ubiquity of oppressive
socio-economic structures that place women in situations of dependency is
striking, and they cannot be grasped via newmaterialist affirmations of human
participation in the generality of material being. Furthermore, resistance to
such oppressive structures requires engaging in distinctly human forms of
agency, where moral claims and political goals must be articulated, and judg-
ments and plans must be made to enable coordinated action. Because they do
not smoothly emerge from human participation in the “singularity” of material
being, Beauvoir argues that forms of solidarity must intentionally be created
through political struggle.67
4 Abortion: Physis and Anti-physis
As Frost has pointed out, recent research on the development of germ cell
DNA during pregnancy shows it to be a highly interactive “biocultural” pro-
cess: the porosity of genes, their plasticity in response to environmental fac-
tors, and their role in the transmission of intergenerational change mean that
fetal development is not the predetermined, automatic process that it was pre-
sumed tobe inBeauvoir’s era.68 Even so, from thepoint of viewof awomanwho
66 Women in full-time employment earn on average about 82% of what men do in the
US, with young women earning more equally with men and—not surprisingly—the gap
increasing as women enter child-bearing age. “Fact Sheet, September 2019,” webpage,
Institute forWomen’s Policy Research, www.iwpr.org.
67 As she wrote earlier, “wars, unemployment, crises plainly show that there doesn’t exist
any pre-established harmony betweenmen […]. [S]olidarities are created, but aman can-
not enter into solidarity with all others […]. One will always work for certain men against
others.”PCE, p. 108.
68 Frost, Biocultural Creatures, ch. 5, pp. 53–76.
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has an unwanted pregnancy, gestation still marches on irrevocably towards its
dread culmination in the birth of an undesired baby—unless this march can
be halted.
Truly scandalous to her readers in 1949, Beauvoir began the chapter of The
Second Sex on “The Mother” with an extended discussion of abortion. She did
so with the very precise intention to shock: to disrupt and denaturalize sac-
charine myths of motherhood as women’s “natural” function and the source of
their fulfilment. Moreover, the stigmatization and (still today) frequent crimi-
nalization of abortion constitutes one of the bluntest tools for women’s near-
literal reification. Forcedmaternity treats a woman as nomore than a womb, a
passive vessel, an object to be used for purposes not her own, and with all that
follows in terms of material dependency and constraint.
Beauvoir explores bothpregnancy andabortion as uniquely heightened sites
of human embodied experience. A pregnancy is lived as at once a sui generis
experience and as an intense revelation of human ambiguity. For in pregnancy
a woman’s body most literally both is and yet is not “herself.” In pregnancy, a
woman is not a simple “prey to the species” but a living subject, and there is “a
drama which plays out between a woman and herself.”69 The fetus both is and
is not her: she both possesses it and yet it possesses her; it both enriches her and
threatens her: she and the fetus form an “ambivalent couple.”70 Thus, beyond
what we could call the “normal” ambiguity of human existence as a “tear” in
being, one finds a yet more heightened experience of ambiguity that is specific
to a pregnant woman—and an abortion is a yet further tearing apart of that
self. For although a woman is not the material vessel that men may endeavor
to make of her, neither is she a sovereign subject for whom her body is a sepa-
rate material object. As new materialists would concur, her body is not a mere
res extensa from which she can detach herself.
However, at the same time, Beauvoir’s discussion directs us elsewhere, for
abortion also presents a “particularly acute” formof “anti-physis.”71 An abortion
is a uniquely human disruption of an on-going mammalian biological process.
It is a deliberate, conscious rupturing of gestation in which a woman’s own
ambivalent flesh will be destroyed. Thus “she feels [elle éprouve] these contra-
dictions in her wounded flesh”; she is “divided within herself,” so that, “even if
she does not positively want maternity, she feels ill at ease with the ambiguity
of the act she performs.”72 Although members of some species may abandon
69 SS, p. 538, translation modified; DSII, p. 349.
70 SS, p. 538; DSII, p. 350.
71 SS, p. 524; DSII, p. 330.
72 SS, pp. 532, 531, translation modified; DSII, pp. 342, 340.
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or kill their young, no other species (as far as we know) can intervene in this
way to halt the process of gestation once it has begun. However ambivalent or
coerced a woman’s decision to abort may be (and it may, of course, be highly
coerced), an abortionmust be an intentional human intervention that disrupts
abiological process.Here, contrary toBennett’s Spinozism, “man” (or “woman”)
does “ ‘disturb rather than follow nature’s order’.” In abortion, both physis and
anti-physis, the ambiguity of a woman’s existence—and, indeed, of all human
existence—as being at once “nature” and its “disturbance” is starkly revealed.
Furthermore, an abortion is an intervention that is always undertaken with-
in a particular social context, here within (and also reinforcing) a conjuncture
of oppressive socio-economic, cultural, and political institutions and practices
that perpetuate women’s alterity. In the hostile treatment of abortion the real-
ities of masculine power are visibly materialized in economic, legal, medical,
religious, and other institutions. Discussing abortion through a historicalmate-
rialist lens, Beauvoir also argues that in postwar France it is most often a “class
crime.”73Wealthy women have resources to travel elsewhere for the procedure,
and abortion is predominantly an illegal act of working-class women. Accord-
ing to studies she cites, poverty, lack of housing, and the need to seek paidwork
are among the most common reasons for seeking an abortion. Furthermore,
most womenwho abort aremothers who are unable to support more children.
As Beauvoirwryly notes, “this hideouswomanwhoaborts is also thiswonderful
mother who rocks two blond angels in her arms: the same woman.”74
Today, in the US, nearly two-thirds of women who abort also have a child
already, and most live in absolute or relative poverty. In a recent study, most
gave their inability to afford raising a child as a reason for aborting.75 Thus,
in spite of great advances in reproductive technology, little has changed eco-
nomically and politically with regard to abortion since Beauvoir’s time. Indeed,
the present relentless proscribing and recriminalization of abortion, both in
the US and elsewhere, speak to Beauvoir’s perspicacity in placing the ques-
tion of abortion at the very beginning of her treatment of “motherhood”—for
73 SS, p. 527; DSII, p. 334. Not only the abortionist but also the woman who underwent an
abortion was liable to prosecution in France at the time.
74 SS, p. 527, translation modified; DSII, p. 335.
75 In a recent study of women having an abortion, 59 percent had previously given birth to
a child or children. Seventy-five percent gave as a reason for aborting that they could not
afford to have the child. The majority were in poverty: 42 percent below Federal poverty
level; an additional 26 percent at 100–199 percent below it. Sixty-one percent were non-
white. Contrary to the popular image, only 12 percent were teenagers. See “Fact Sheet:
InducedAbortion in theUnited States,” webpage, Guttmacher Institute, www.guttmacher
.org/fact‑sheet/induced‑abortion‑united‑states.
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sadly it is where it still belongs. This is also why when, in the 1970s, Beau-
voir became involved with the growing women’s movement in France she
visibly—and scandalously—threw her presence into the struggle for abortion
rights.
5 For a Modest Human Exceptionalism
As seen in her discussion of abortion—and inThe SecondSexmore generally—
Beauvoir affirms not only significant material continuities but also important
distinctions between nonhuman species and human beings: she makes the
ontological case for affirming what I am calling a “modest human exceptional-
ism.” For Beauvoir, as for the newmaterialists, the embodied quality of human
life situates it inextricably within the singularity, the plenum, of all sentient
life where, to recall her description, “a project swells from every function.” Con-
trary to the fantasy of “man” as the “Absolute,” the “Subject,” the “Sovereign,” our
materiality does not constitute a limit fromwhich we can or should attempt to
escape. To the contrary, she and the new materialists agree that it is only as
embodied beings that humans feel, think, act, and are open to new “becom-
ings.” Yet, at the same time, Beauvoir also shows us why the more emphatic
new materialist denials of human exceptionalism, such as Bennett’s, can be
problematic. For new materialist anti-exceptionalism tends to deflect atten-
tion not only from the distinctive intra-human qualities of human freedombut
also from its vulnerability to human oppressions and fromour responsibility to
resist them.76Writing in the 1940s, it is not surprising that Beauvoir’smaterialist
orientation did not lead her to extend her ethical reach beyond human exis-
tence to other forms of being. One could hypothesize that, were she alive today,
she would share at least some of the ecological concerns of the new material-
ists. However, she would still want firmly to insist on the distinctive qualities of
human existence, above all the qualities of human freedom.
76 Women are not the only groupwhose oppression concerned Beauvoir. Already inThe Sec-
ond Sex, and anticipating her later extensive support of anti-colonial struggles, she writes
of how the “mystery” attributed to woman as the Other is also attributed to “Black” and
“Yellow” people “insofar as they are considered absolutely as the inessential Other.” SS,
p. 271; DSI, p. 403.
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